This paper analyzes six waves of responses from the World Values Survey to understand the determinants of beliefs about women's roles in society and their relationship with the legal system and outcomes. Using survey data for 300,000 individuals, we find that characteristics of an individual's home country only explain about a fifth of the variation in values, and a single individual can report strongly different norms about women's equality across different domains. There is a strong correlation between norms, laws and female labor force participation and between norms and the proportion of legislators who are women-but not between norms and relative female tertiary education. There is some suggestive evidence that laws may be more significant than norms in determining female employment outcomes, but the available evidence does not allow for strong causal statements at the cross-country level.
Introduction
The last century has witnessed dramatic transitions in outcomes related to women's empowerment both in developed and developing countries, including a substantial increase in female labor force participation and girls' primary education around the world. This progress is related to corresponding changes in both laws and social normsequal opportunity legislation and an increased value put on girls' literacy, for example. The relationship between policies, norms and outcomes is clearly interdependent. Existing literature provides some evidence on norm changes driving policy change as well as outcomes, policy change altering outcomes and norms, and exogenous outcome changes propelling new norms.
This paper discusses examples of these interlinkages related to gender and then studies the interlinkages using data from the World Values Survey, the World Bank's Women, Business, and the Law database, and a number of outcome variables to try to understand how attitudes towards gender have progressed over time and how these shifts might be related to outcomes, without any claim to strong identication of specic causal pathways. Section 2 discusses previous research focused on the intersection of international and national legal reform, norms and outcomes. Section 3 discusses the various data sources, and section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the relationship between laws, key outcomes for women, and values, and section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
Available literature provides some evidence of bi-directional casual relationships between all three of attitudes, laws and outcomes.
Attitudes and Laws
Laws can be expressive in nature (Benabou and Tirole, 2011) ; by carrying with them a potential signaling eect, they relay and arm what is already considered acceptable (or unacceptable) within a given social context, particularly when properly enforced. Especially in democracies, it would be expected that shifting popular opinion might be reected in legal change. But attitudes might also change in response to a law because of respect for laws or because changed behavior (outcomes) leads to changed attitudes. Kuran (1995) has argued for this second channel: if the goal is attitude change, the reason citizens comply with a legal mandate is less important than that they comply and that citizens see others complying:
Eventually, citizens assume others are complying not because they must, but because they want to and this perception contributes to a shift in social norms. Kotsadam and Jakobsson (2011) are among the few who specically examine the impact of laws on social norms. Using longitudinal survey data from Norway and Sweden, they found that a law criminalizing the purchase of sexual services did not aect moral attitudes toward prostitution. In the short term, something similar appears to be true with regard to gay marriage in the US: while support for marriage equality increased from 27 percent to 60 percent in the twenty years prior to the Supreme Court decision declaring a constitutional right to marriage equality, it has not seen a marked jump since the decision. Using the European Values Survey, Guetto et al. (2015) determine that religiosity is 1 http://www.gallup.com/poll/191645/americans-support-gay-marriage-remains-high.aspx 3 positively correlated with fertility and inversely correlated with women working outside the home. Gender attitudes were also found to be correlated with women's labor market decisions. Giavazzi et al. (2013) nd that attitudes towards women's role in the family as reected in the World Values Survey are signicantly related to female labor force participation after controlling for policies, institutions and structural factors of economies. Alesina and Giuliano (2014) link strong family ties (determined through three World Values Survey questions) with lower rates of women working outside the home, among other outcomes.
With a greater claim to causality from attitudes to outcomes, Arpino et al. (2015) nd that gender-equitable attitudes relate to fertility outcomes; an initial drop in fertility is observed as countries' gender attitudes become more progressive. Beyond a certain threshold, additional improvements in gender attitudes then become positively associated with fertility.
The authors also nd that the convergence of men's and women's attitudes makes a dierence:
when men and women agree, changes are more rapid, and the relation between attitudes and fertility strengthens.
While outcomes may be shaped by norms, outcomes can also shape norms. This can be demonstrated by looking at the exogenous shock of technological progress: innovations like the dishwasher (Greenwood et al., 2005) and medical advances are both considered to have contributed to increases in female labor force participation and associated gender norms.
In addition, Thornton et al. (1983) use an 18-year panel dataset to conclude that maternal employment, educational attainment, and labor market experience all contribute to more gender-egalitarian views. Hwang (2016) , Burt and Scott (2002) and Kielcolt and Acock (1988) all nd that the presence of a working mother makes children's gender attitudes more progressive. Again, Fernandez and Fogli (2006) examine second generation US immigrants and show that women's fertility and labor market participation are strongly correlated with the past fertility rates in migrants' home countries. Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) nd a role model eect when women enter the labor force, making it easier for others to join.
2.3 Laws and Outcomes
Laws are regulative in nature (Licht, 2008) ; by imposing punishments and rewards for particular types of conduct, laws can incentivize or dis-incentivize specic acts or behaviors.
But if they (merely) reect underlying norms or if they deviate from norms and enforcement is weak, their independent impact on outcomes may be muted. It may be the breakdown of enforcement that explains why in some circumstances laws including those mandating a minimum age of marriage sometimes have little eect (Collin and Talbot, forthcoming).
2 Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2013b) explore the relationship between laws and outcomes (including women's labor force participation, fertility and mortality rates, and girls' rates of school enrollment), concluding that narrowing gender gaps in legal rights is correlated with greater female labor force participation, women's transition from agricultural to wage employment, lower adolescent fertility and maternal and infant mortality, and increases in girls' school enrollment, but they do not control for norms nor address potential reverse causality.
Examining the impact of specic laws in settings that allow for stronger causal inference. Deininger et al. (2010) and Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2010) determine that the reform of Hindu Succession Act (which expanded daughters' inheritance rights) and the Ethiopian Family Code both had positive impacts for women: the former signicantly increased daughters' likelihood of inheriting land, and the latter increased women's likelihood of working outside the home, particularly in paid and full-time jobs. Roy and Tam (2016) nd that matrimonial law reform introduced a century ago in parts of India have had a longrun eect on child marriage and school attendance. Bhavnani (2009) studies the impact of quotas on women parliamentary candidates in India and nds that after the requirement to eld a woman has lapsed, constituencies are still more likely to be represented by a woman.
Finally, Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) examine the impact of divorce laws in the United 2 For additional studies examining the impact of legal reform in a wider range of contexts, see Crisman et al. (2016) States and nd statistically signicant declines in the number of women committing suicide, as well as a decline in women murdered by their partners, following the legalization of unilateral divorce.
The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) aims to promote de jure and de facto gender equality by setting out specic obligations for ratifying countries, and country progress is monitored through a mandatory reporting process overseen by the CEDAW Committee. The passage of CEDAW might be seen as a plausible exogenous shock to national laws. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2013a) point to the CEDAW eect, which they assert accounts for laws expanding property rights for unmarried women and inheritance rights for daughters and spouses, among other legal reforms benetting unmarried women in particular. The authors show that the average pace of reform in the ve years after CEDAW's ratication far exceeds the pace of reform prior to its ratication.
This CEDAW eect appears to have passed through to outcomes. Cho (2014) Gray et al. (2006) nd that CEDAW ratication is associated with increased female literacy, participation in the economy, and representation in parliament. Duo (2012) concludes her review of the literature by suggesting economic development improves outcomes but is not itself sucientspecic regulations and laws are additionally necessary.
In conclusion, there are comparatively clear causal relationships that emerge from natural experiments reported in the literature that norms and laws can both independently impact outcomes even while development (improved outcomes) itself can eect norms and laws.
Given the plausible but dependent bi-causal relationships running through all three of attitudes, laws and outcomes, it may be dicult to fully unpack the strength of particular casual relationships at the cross country level. Nonetheless, it is worth examining the correlational 6 relationship between attitudes, laws and outcomes as well as changes in attitudes over time in the area of gender as an input into both national and international decision-making.
3 Data
Gender Values
The six rounds of the World Values Survey span three decades beginning in the early 1980s, covering much of the global population through increasingly representative sampling.
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There are several key questions that indicate gender norms asked both in the nal wave conducted between 2010 and 2014 as well as at least one earlier iteration of the survey:
• When jobs are scarce, men should have more of a right to a job than women
• On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do
• A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl
• When a mother works for pay, the children suer
• Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person
• If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems
• On the whole, men make better business executives than women do
• Women have the same rights as men
The potential responses to these questions take one of several slightly dierent forms. For most, respondents were asked the extent to which they disagree or agree with the statement. is that beliefs about gender can be greatly inuenced by a specic factor that shifts bias along a single dimension only. For instance, given two cities in a country, one city may elect a woman as mayor while the other features a prominent rm owned by a woman. Thus beliefs about whether women make worse political leaders or businessmen than men may shift asymmetrically across these two towns. Nevertheless, the fundamental likelihood of a woman being elected mayor and a woman owning a business might be highly correlated at the country level, as both towns would have similar institutional features.
8 By tracing a constant sample of countries, we can more accurately gauge the evolution of norms. Since wave four, the survey widely adopts sophisticated weights by country to achieve national representation. Scaling by population allows us to adopt this non-random yet sizeable sample of responses to the global sentiment for a given value. Each representative country sample from the World Values Survey is weighted by the portion of the global population that country represents in a given year. Data on population was obtained from the World Bank, except for the cases of China and Taiwan, for which data was taken from the United States Census Bureau.
4 Table 1 Survey to the same countries that asked the same question in the earlier round. This cohort covers a substantial portion (over one half ) of the global population, and the associated weighted means suggest that the global average response to these values has become less gender-equal over time amongst this xed sample. There are some signicant caveats to this result. First, we will present evidence later in the paper suggesting a positive trend over time when using all waves of the values survey and an ordinary least squares regression to evaluate trends over time. Second, results are dierent and more positive using an unweighted sample.
These unweighted results suggest that the average country has moved about one tenth of a standard deviation over the course of about a decade towards believing when jobs are scarce women have equal rights to a job as do men. Put another way, it would take about 450 years for a country to move from 100% agreement that men deserve a job more than women when they are scarce to 100% disagreement on that rate of progress.
Gender Outcomes and Laws
Several indicators from the World Bank are used in order to link gender values to economic outcomes and each country's legal system. Specically, we look at the relationship with the percentage of women in parliament, the female labor force participation rate, and the ratio of the gross tertiary enrollment rates for women to men. The World Bank's Women, Business, • Unmarried equal property rights
• Married equal property rights
• Sons and daughters equal inheritance
• Surviving spouses equal inheritance
• Joint titling default for married couples
• Adult married women head of household or head of family Second, the treatment of a law's enactment is endogenous to the pre-trends in values and outcomes, and thus it is unrealistic to make any assumption about consistency over time between treatment and control in the underlying dynamics. Laws change along with societal values and often are a product of a change in beliefs in themselves. We also considered a synthetic control approach however, we were unable to nd exogenous determinants of important gender outcomes that can be utilized as predictor variables to establish an accurate counterfactual.
Results
Tables 3 through 5 provide evidence on the relationship between our three key gender beliefs from the World Values Survey and individual and country characteristics. The R 2 in column one highlights that less than a fth of the variation in the gender belief is captured by the country where a person resides or the year in which they were asked. This is striking in itself: while substantial literature has pointed to long run determinants of gender norms at a country level, these results mask substantial heterogeneity within a country. Column 2 adds years since the rst interview was conducted in place of year xed eects. With country xed eects, moving forward 50 years is associated with a 0.15 to 0.35 shift on a -1 to 1 scale towards more gender equal views, depending on the specic measure of equality.
Without country xed eects (seen in the coecients in column 9), this trend is insignicant and even negative. It is important to remember however that given the expanding sample of countries included in the World Values Survey, this result could simply be a product of the fact that countries with worse gender norms are more likely to be sampled more recently.
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Column 3 adds the gender, age, income and education level of each respondent to the regression. These results suggest that the older one is, the less gender-equal one's beliefs.
These results include year xed eects, so these are pure cohort impacts. This magnitude however is dwarfed by the dierence between men and women in the sample. The regressions in columns 5, 6, and 7 test these hypotheses, clustering standard errors at the country level when national variables are used. Column 5 adds national net primary enrollment and appears to imply that both the individual and national education level may both matterwhile coecients on self-reported education remain similar, national primary education also enters signicantlyalthough this may reect the inuence of an omitted, correlated variable. At face value, the results suggest going from a 50 percent to 100 percent net primary enrollment would be associated with a .5 shift towards gender equal views on a -1 to 1 scalemore than half the global standard deviationfor the value regarding rights to a job. Yet the signicance of this coecient is not consistent across gender norms and only appears in about half of the results. Similarly, a ten percent increase in log GDP per capita is associated with a .07 increase in the gender view of a woman's right to a job, but with country xed eects and years since 1989, the eect of GDP per capita disappears or turns negative, suggesting a limited relationship between changes in GDP and changes in norms.
In general, we are able to explain about twice as much of the variation in individual-level beliefs for right to a job and political leaders than for university education, driven almost entirely by dierences in the predictive power of the country xed eects.
We next examine three outcomes as dependent variables in regressions with values, laws and GDP per capita: female labor force participation (Table 6 ), the percent of parliamentarians who are women (Table 7) , and relative tertiary enrollment (Table 8) . Note the caveat that we have seen there are plausible bi-causal relationships between outcomes, laws and attitudes, emphasizing that outcomes are dependent variables in name only.
The results suggest the legal score entered alone is positively and signicantly related to outcomes. Moving from having no gender equal laws to 100 percent (a move from 0 to 1 on the legal score) is associated with a 64 percent increase in the labor force participation rate.
When entered with an attitude measure and GDP per capita, the legal score drops out while the attitude measure remains signicant. As shown in column 5, moving from a country in which half of people have a regressive stance on gender norms to one where none do is associated with a 22 percent increase in female labor force participation rates (conditional on time, proportion of gender positive laws, and log GDP per capita.) Similarly to the regressions predicting beliefs about gender, education remains an outlier as compared to government and employment. In fact, a country's average belief about whether a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl has no signicant predictive power on its relative tertiary enrollment ratio. This is consistent with the results from Table 4 highlighting substantial heterogeneity within countries about this belief, suggesting that an average would not be indicative of the actual distribution of views on women's higher education in a country, perhaps particularly amongst that minority of families who can send a child to college. Table 9 links laws to norms. Across the board, having more gender positive beliefs is associated with having more gender positive laws. Almost certainly this causality runs in both directionshowever, it is important to note that beliefs explain only about 15 percent or less of the variation in the proportion of gender positive laws. Furthermore, log GDP per capita is at no point a signicant predictor of a country's legal score, suggesting that growth in and of itself does not lead governments to be more gender-equal. Over time, most countries have made progress in improving outcomes for women and girls, and our results suggest the potential for this progress to continue: young (educated) people have more positive attitudes and the trend over time in most countries is toward greater belief in equality amongst all age groups. And that laws are not determined solely by level of development or norms suggests policymakers may have discretion in revising them.
The evidence of the CEDAW eect presented in the literature review suggests using this discretion to reform discriminatory laws may have some independent impact on outcomes.
Yet there is still a substantial uncertainty about the drivers of key norms and outcomes. 
(8) 
